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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
preventive power of a court of equity is a proper remedy for effectuating the rights of privacy. Moreover, equity is capable of granting
relief in the average case awarding damages as incidental to an
,injunction.
In summation, it may be stated that the development of the law
of privacy in various jurisdictions is favorable. The right of an individual to be let alone, or to live without unwarranted invasion by
the public in matters of private nature has become more increasingly
apparent during the last two decades. This view is evidenced by
holdings in certain jurisdictions wherein the right of privacy has
already received cognizance either as an individual 50 or property
right. 51 However, New York courts have been very conservative
in the past, holding steadfastly to the common law rule. With the
exception of the statute, 52 they deny the legal existence of such
right; and in view of the recent holdings of the Baumann 53 and
Somberg 54 cases, it is seemingly evident that they will not for some
time give recognition to the right of privacy as a common law right.
But it is interesting to note that, of late years, they have more liberally construed the statute. It is some evidence that New York will
subsequently follow the Georgian decision 55 either through judicial
decision or further legislative enactment.
ALEXANDER

A. MERSACK.

RIGHT OF ACTION OF THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARIES UNDER

THE

N. I. R. A.
In the recently decided case of Canton v. The Palms, Inc.,' decided in the City Court of Buffalo, N. Y., an action involving the
construction and application of the President's Reemployment Agreement and the Restaurant Industry Basic Code, approved by the
N. R. A., it was held that the plaintiffs were entitled to recover the
difference between wages paid under the contract of employment,
and the minimum wage clause, as embodied in the Restaurant Industry Basic Code.
In line with the general tendency to effectuate the purposes of
the N. I. R. A. this case was decided on the traditional doctrines of
contract. In interpreting the President's Reemployment Agreement,
' Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., supra note 2.
' Supra note 5.
' Supra note 21.
'Baumann v. Baumann, supra note 1.
" Somberg v. Somberg, supra note 1.
Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., supra note 2.
' 152 Misc. 347, 273 N. Y. Supp. 239 (1934).
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the court relied on the general principles as first laid down in this
state by the case of Lawrence v. Fox,2 and extended by Seaver v.4
Ransom.3 The court pointed out various clauses in the P. R. A.,
together with the paragraph at the head of this agreement, stating
the intent thereof, to wit, "To every employer: 1. This agreement
is part of a nationwide plan to raise wages, create employment and
thus increase purchasing power and restore business." Interpreting
these as clauses binding upon the employer for the benefit of the
employee, the court finds such employees as coming within the rule
of third party beneficiaries with a right in them to sue on the contract. The court also states that the code involved herein is founded
in and grows out of the P. R. A.
The rule of Lawrence v. Fox, modernizing "the archaic view of
a contract as creating a strictly personal obligation," 5 as extended
by later decisions, may well be applied to cases of this sort. As
Kellog, P.J., writing for the lower court in Seaver v. Ransom, said:
"The doctrine of Lawrence v. Fox is progressive, not to retrograde.
The course of the late decisions is to enlarge, not to limit the effect
of that case." Again in Seaver v. Ransom, Pound, J., said: "The
right of the beneficiary to sue on a contract made expressly for his
benefit has been fully recognized in many American jurisdictions * * *
and is said to be the prevailing rule in this country. * * * It has been
said that 'the establishment of this doctrine has been gradual, and is
a victory of practical utility over theory, of equity over technical
subtlety.' "
It would seem that today a third party beneficiary would encounter no great difficulty in asserting his rights under the contract,
provided of course, the beneficiary is clearly designated as such.6
In the principal case the employees, although not expressy named,
may be considered sufficiently clearly designated to bring them within
the rule.7
The question in these cases is: Does an individual have a right
of action for damages arising out of a violation by the employer of
the P. R. A. agreements, and the code provisions? The difficulty in
220 N. Y. 268 (1859).
'224 N. Y. 233, 120 N. E. 639 (1918).
Not to pay certain of the classes of employees involved less than $15 per

week; not to work any of the employees for zpore than forty hours in any one
week; not to pay any employees of certain other classes less than forty cents
per hour; not to use any subterfuge to frustrate the spirit and intent of the
agreement which is, among other things, to increase employment by universal
covenant, and * * * to shorten hours and to raise wages for the shorter week
to a living basis, etc.
See Langel v. Betz, 250 N. Y. 159, 163, 164 N. E. 890, 892 (1928).
6
Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N. Y. 170, 174 N. E. 441 (1931).
Cardozo, Ch. J., says: "In the field of the law of contracts there has been a
gradual widening of the doctrine of Lawrence v. Fox (20. N. Y. 268) until
today the beneficiary of a promise, clearly designated as such, is seldom left
without a remedy."
'Whitehead v. Burgess, 61 N. J. Law 75, 38 Atl. 802 (1897).
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arriving at a solution relates to the dispute as to whether the codes
and agreements under the N. I. R. A. are contractual or legislative;
and whether the enforcement is limited to the Federal District Attorneys instituting actions in the various Federal District Courts. In
the main, the general tendency has been in favor of allowing a right
of action to the individual on concepts of contract, with respect to
the President's Reemployment Agreement. There have been cases
allowing right of action to individuals with respect also to codes, but
to a lesser degree. Many decisions in a number of states have adopted these views. s Individuals have also been upheld in injunction
proceedings to restrain code violations. 9
While, then, under the P. R. A. the opinions have generally upheld the contract view, the real dispute arises out of the construction
of the codes. The chief contentions in support of the codes being
strictly of legislative force follow:
In Title I of the N. I. R. A., Section 3-b, it is provided that
when a code is approved it shall constitute a standard of fair competition for that industry. This applies, therefore, the force of law
to the approved code of an industry governing those who have assented as well as those who have not assented. So, too, where codes
have not been submitted or approved, the President may formulate
and approve a code for that industry.
Section 3-c provides as follows: "The several District Courts
of the United States are hereby invested with jurisdiction to prevent
and restrain violations of any code of fair competition approved
under this title; and it shall be the duty of the several district attorneys of the United States in their respective districts, under the
direction of the Attorney General, to institute proceedings in equity
to prevent and restrain such violations."
It is this section, 3-c, which is pointed to as creating the exclusive remedy which is to be enforced in the particular way and in the
particular tribunal mentioned therein, to the exclusion of all other
remedies, parties, and courts. Certain courts, therefore, have denied
actions by individuals on the ground that they have no right of action, and the court is unable to entertain same, by virtue of Section
' Beaton v. Avondale, Dist. Ct. 2d Jud. Dist. Colo., Oct. 25, 1933; see
Mesloh v. Schulte, 151 Misc. 750, 273 N. Y. Supp. 699 (1934) ; Chipa v. Regas,
Justice of the Peace Ct., Tuczon, Ariz., Nov. 24, 1933; Bethel v. Karras,
Common Pleas Ct., Detroit, Mich., Nov., 1933; Godkin v. Jett, Mun. Ct. Hot
Springs, Ark., 1933; Williams v. Rienze Valet Co., Mun. Ct., Chicago, Ill.,
1933; Greleck v. Amsterdam, Mun. Ct. of Phila., Pa., Jan., 1934, No. 1105;
Tedford v. Taylor, Justice of the Peace, Ct., Kansas City, Mo., Jan., 1934;
Parlo v. Hilton et aL, Justice of the Pease Ct., Mecklenburg Co., N. C., Feb.
9, 1934; Crowson v. Alley et al., Justice of the Peace Ct., Precinct No. 1,
Dallas, Tex., Feb. 20, 1934; Tracy v. Stureck, Mun. Ct., Omaha, Neb., 1934;
Walter v. Hyman-Rose Tobacco Co., City Ct., Buffalo, N. Y., May, 1934.
' Sherman v. Abeles, 150 Misc. 497, 269 N. Y. Supp. 849, aff'd, 241 App.
Div. 677, 269 N. Y. Supp. 1023 (1934); see Fryns v. Fairlawn Fur Dressing
Co., 168 Atl. 862 (Ct. of Chancery, N. J., Nov. 14, 1933).
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3-c. 10 In Galveston H. & S. A. R. R. v. Wallace," the court states,
at page 490, "Where the statute creating the right provides for an
exclusive remedy to be enforced in a particular way or before a special tribunal, the aggrieved party will be left to the remedy given by
the statute which created the right."
Since, then, the N. I. R. A. constitutes an approved code as law
binding the industry; and since it empowers the imposing of a code
upon an industry; thus binding non-assenters as well as assenters,
the codes may be considered as purely legal; and the remedy stated
in the N. I. R. A. as a special one, which alone must be pursued.
In opposition to the above, and in favor of actions in the individuals arising out of the codes, the following may be stated:
If the individual is not allowed to sue for the minimum wage,
for example, then there is no way that payment may be enforced
directly for the benefit of the injured individual. There is no provision in the N. I. R. A. awarding judgments in favor of the aggrieved party, although in a roundabout way, the employers may be
forced, either by fine or injunctions, to make restitution. Should the
employer refuse to pay, however, then actual payment to the employee cannot be enforced. As a matter of fact, in a number of instances the courts have allowed individuals to enforce these
code
2
violations, both by injunctions and actions for damages.'
With respect to Section 3-c, while apparently this section limits
the jurisdiction of code violation cases to Federal District Courts,
and the institution of these actions to the district attorneys, it is not
an exclusive grant of jurisdiction, certainly not in terms, and unless
the intention is to grant exclusive jurisdiction, the general rule that
one who is injured by the violation of any right or obligation, whether
it arises by contract or under a statute, whether state or federal, has
a right of action in any court of competent jurisdiction, 3 should
apply.
" John Staley et al. v. Peabody Coal Co., U. S. D. C. for S. D., Ill.,
Dec.
16, 1933; see Purvis v. Bazemore, 5 Fed. Sup. 230 (1933) ; Colorado et al. v.
United Dividend Corp., Dist. Ct. Colo. No. 5262, Nov. 28, 1933; Western

Powder Mfg. Co. v. Interstate Coal Co., U. S. D. C. E. D. Ill., E. No. 208-D.,
Jan. 8, 1934.
"223 U. S.481, 32 Sup. Ct. 205 (1912).
Brodsky v. Sharbu Operating Co., Sup. Ct. N. Y. Co., Spec. Term,
N. Y. L. J., Feb. 8, 1934; see Sherman v. Abeles, 150 Misc. 497, 269 N. Y. Supp.

849, aff'd, 241 App. Div. 677, 269 N. Y. Supp. 1023 (- Dept. 1934); American
Cloak and Suit Makers Ass'n, Inc. v. Merchant Ladies Garment Ass'n, Inc.,

Sup. Ct. N. Y. Co., Spec. Term, N. Y. L. J., Feb. 2, 1934; Hoffman v.

Zerwos, Mun. Ct., N. Y. City, Bronx, 1st Dist., N. Y. Herald Tribune, Nov.

2, 1933, at 6.

"Minneapolis & St. Louis R. R. v. Bombalis, 241 U. S.211 (1916); see
Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U. S.130, 137 (1876): "So rights, whether legal or

equitable, acquired under the laws of the United States, may be prosecuted in

the United States Courts, or in the state courts, competent to decide rights of
the like character and class; subject to this qualification, that where a right
arises under a law of the United States, Congress may, if it see fit, give to
the Federal Court, exclusive jurisdiction."
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Since the P. R. A. is more nearly contractual than are the codes,
it is more readily understood why many more decisions have upheld
the actions of third party beneficiaries, under these than under the
codes. To say, however, that the codes are strictly legal and not contractual, is not entirely correct. As among the signatories to the
codes some rights on which a signatory can sue others, either in
injunction or damages would probably be allowed. As regards third
party beneficiaries, their rights are not as clear as under the P. R. A.
Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that they are clearly and distinctly
set forth as beneficiaries under these codes, whether contractual or
statutory, and their rights to such benefits should be safeguarded in
order to carry out the very intent of these code provisions. They
may be safeguarded under the view that the codes are contractual
or that they may sue in their own name and for their own benefit
for the damages sustained by them where they are injured beneficiaries of a statute. 14 As said in Willy v. Mullady,15 "It is a general
rule that whenever one owes another a duty, whether such duty be
imposed by voluntary contract, or by statute, a breach of such duty
causing damage, gives a right of action."
For if the codes are considered strictly of legal force, and the
individual is not allowed his right of action, then strictly speaking the
following absurd situation might result: An employer had been
paying his employee a certain wage under a pre-code contract. With
the adoption of the code the minimum wage clause entitles the employee to a greater wage. The employer then refuses to pay any
wages after a certain length of service. If the employee wishes to
sue for damages, how much shall he sue for? If he sues for the
code minimum, he is met with the view that the codes are not contractual, and the remedy is limited to Section 3-c of the N. I. R. A.,
and that his remedy is to complain to the N. R. A. authorities. If
he does so, he still may not receive his money, by virtue of the fact
that there is no authority in the law allowing an award of judgment
in favor of the employee. In practice, the employee would probably
be compensated because of the remedies provided for code enforcement, to wit, (1) the District Court injunctions, Section 3-c; (2) the
provision that every violation of an approved code affecting interstate and foreign commerce shall be a misdemeanor, punishable by
a fine of five hundred dollars for each offense, Section 3-f; and the
power of the President to license business enterprises in order to
make effective codes or agreements; with the penalty of a maximum
of $500 fine and six months' imprisonment, or both, to one carrying
on business without such a license, Section 4-b. But theoretically,
and practically, too, in the remote cases of complete refusal of an
employer to pay, irrespective of penalties or injunctions, the indi" Willy v. Mullady, 78 N. Y. 310 (1879) ; see Amberg v. Kinly, 214 N. Y.
531, 108 N. E. 830 (1915).
1At p. 314.
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vidual may get no satisfaction. If then the employee wishes to sue
for his wages, shall he sue under the pre-code contract of his employment. If so, he can only sue for his pre-code wages, but the
code benefits are here too denied him. Then, too, what happens to
the original contract of employment? Is it still a contract, or does
the code supersede and destroy or impair it? It would seem, therefore, that whether you allow the individual his right of action for the
code minimum wage under the doctrine of contract, or as a beneficiary to enforce his right corresponding to the duty imposed by the
statute, a recovery by the individual in his own name, is indicated.
Otherwise, the benefits granted to him under the Recovery Act,
while they may be detriments to the recalcitrant employer, to the
employee may be no benefits at all.
It is submitted, that were the codes interpreted, as in some instances they have been, to give the individual his right of action,
that this would be the most direct and simplest method of procedure.
While it is true that the codes have the force of law, it is, nevertheless, also true that they were conceived and executed in the nature
Ordinarily they cannot be both, and yet they are
of agreements.1
not clearly and exclusively either. Perhaps, in view of the fact that
this is emergency legislation, which creates distinctly new conditions
and relations among individuals, groups of individuals, and the government, both legal and, in a sense, contractual, a new category may
arise to cover these codes, or "contractual statutes," if you will, with
the following, admittedly strained, but perhaps not totally unreasonable, interpretation: Codes to be considered as having the attributes
of both legislation and contract, a dual nature, so to speak, in order
to allow the individual his right of action in his own name and for
his own benefit, following doctrines of contract, and at the same time,
enforcing their legal aspect by the methods provided for in the
various sections of the Recovery Act.
WALTER W.

PADWE.

THE SECONDARY BOYCOTT IN NEW YORK.

The failure of the National Recovery Administration to enforce
its own laws for the protection of labor 1 has forced the realization

"See President's Special Message, May 17, 1933, recommending passage of
Bill introduced by Sen. Wagner (later to become the N. I. R. A.) : "But the
public interest will be served if, with the authority and guidance of the government, private industries are permitted to make agreements and codes insuring
fair competition."
'INT. JuR. AssN. BULL., Vol. 3, No. 2 at 6 (July, 1934); id. Vol. 3, No. 4
at 8 (Sept., 1934) ; id. Vol. 2, No. 9 at 1 (Feb., 1934) ; id. Vol. 2, No. 12 at 11
(May, 1934).

